Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component

Evidence

Thus a normative theory of games, a theory of strategy, depending on intellectual coordination, has a component that is inherently empirical; it depends on how people can coordinate their expectations. It depends therefore on skill and on context. The rational player must address himself to the empirical question of how, in the particular context of his own game, two rational players might achieve tacit coordination of choices, if he is to find in the game a basis for sharing an a priori expectation of the outcome with his partner. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 662

Categorization

• XREF: Bolsters the reader’s Gambetta mapping — the strategic value of mafia hospitality rituals is an empirical, context-dependent coordination device, exactly as Schelling describes. — connects to: Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669; Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366; Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 875

Related

• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.89)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.85)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.84)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.83)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.81)
• Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it (similarity 0.81)
• Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans (similarity 0.81)
• Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key (similarity 0.81)
• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation (similarity 0.80)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.80)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.80)
• Coordination requires a common source of suggestion (similarity 0.79)
• Parties cannot choose which coordination signal will govern them (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.78)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366
• Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle. #exemplifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 875