Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy

Evidence

It is not being argued that players just do respond to the non-mathematical properties of the game but that they ought to take them into account, hence that even a normative theory—a theory of the strategy of games—must recognize that rational players may jointly take advantage of them. And even when one rational player realizes that the configuration of these details discriminates against him, he may also rationally recognize that he has no recourse—that the other player will rationally expect him to submit to the discipline of the suggestions that emanate from the game’s concrete details and will take actions that, on pain of mutual damage, assume he will co-operate. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 257

Categorization

• QUESTION: How does this normative requirement square with a theory based purely on mathematical payoff structures — where does the residual irrationality sit?
• XREF: connects to: Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 653; Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 851; Being rational, informed, and in control is not always strategic — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 52 (+3 more)

Related

• Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it (similarity 0.89)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.87)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.86)
• Mathematical solutions only focus expectations when players perceive each other as mathematicians (similarity 0.86)
• Rational agreement operates through shared psychic expectations, not mathematical reasoning (similarity 0.85)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.84)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.83)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.83)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.82)
• Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural (similarity 0.82)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.81)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.81)
• Rational players cannot opt out of social coordination when efficiency requires it (similarity 0.80)
• Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs (similarity 0.80)
• Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure #expands (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669