Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point

Evidence

In a game that has absolutely no details but its mathematical structure, in which no inadvertent contextual matter can make itself appreciated by a player as something that the other can appreciate too, there may be nothing to work on but a continuum of numbers. And all the numbers can be sorted according to whether they correspond to symmetrical or asymmetrical divisions. If all numbers but one represent an asymmetrical split, then sheer mathematical symmetry is a sufficient rule and a supremely helpful one in concerting on a common choice. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 658

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Milgrom et al. private-judge framework: symmetric enforcement conventions reduce coordination costs. — connects to: Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 624; Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134; A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 873 (+4 more)

Related

• Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. (similarity 0.87)
• Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry (similarity 0.85)
• Non-symmetry beats both committed symmetry and committed asymmetry. (similarity 0.83)
• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.82)
• Mathematical symmetry fails as a bargaining principle under value uncertainty (similarity 0.81)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.81)
• A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point. (similarity 0.81)
• Asymmetry cannot be proven inconsistent with player rationality (similarity 0.80)
• Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural (similarity 0.80)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.80)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.80)
• Defining rationality to include symmetry strips the theory of empirical content (similarity 0.80)
• Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device (similarity 0.79)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134
• Mathematical symmetry fails as a bargaining principle under value uncertainty #contradicts (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 283
• Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 634
• Defining rationality to include symmetry strips the theory of empirical content #complicates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 650
• A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point. #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 873