Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans

Evidence

Whenever the communication structure does not permit players to divide the task ahead of time according to an explicit plan, it may not be easy to coordinate behavior in the course of the game. Players have to understand each other, to discover patterns of individual behavior that make each player’s actions predictable to the other; they have to test each other for a shared sense of pattern or regularity and to exploit clichés, conventions, and impromptu codes for signaling their intentions and responding to each other’s signals. They must communicate by hint and by suggestive behavior. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 206

Categorization

• XREF: Directly the mechanism of tacit contract enforcement inside a Mafia — omerta and ritualized hints substitute for formal written agreements. — connects to: Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678; Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134; Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147 (+4 more)

Related

• Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key (similarity 0.88)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit coordination is guess-the-guesser recursion, not prediction of average behavior. (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points (similarity 0.82)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.81)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.81)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.80)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.80)
• Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Tacit coordination is guess-the-guesser recursion, not prediction of average behavior. #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 224
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367