Coordination play seeks a meeting of minds while minimax play avoids any
Evidence
In the pure-coordination game, the player’s objective is to make contact with the other player through some imaginative process of introspection, of searching for shared clues; in the minimax strategy of a zero-sum game—most strikingly so with randomized choice—one’s whole objective is to avoid any meeting of minds, even an inadvertent one. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 229
Categorization
- DEFINE: Contrasts the two distinct intellectual processes — introspective contact versus randomized avoidance — that define coordination vs zero-sum reasoning.
- XREF: connects to: Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 641; Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367; A randomized minimax strategy deliberately destroys all communication between players — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 250 (+1 more)
Related
- A randomized minimax strategy deliberately destroys all communication between players (similarity 0.88)
- Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.86)
- Threats and promises are meaningless in zero-sum games (similarity 0.83)
- Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.81)
- Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.80)
- Destroying communication can be a winning move in coordination games. (similarity 0.79)
- In coordination, neither player can outsmart the other without outsmarting himself (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- A randomized minimax strategy deliberately destroys all communication between players
#expands(0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 250 - Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367