Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs

Evidence

By abstracting from communication and enforcement systems and by treating perfect symmetry between players as the general case rather than a special one, game theory may have overshot the level at which the most fruitful work could be done and may have defined away some of the essential ingredients of typical nonzero-sum games. Preoccupied with the solution to the nonzero-sum game, game theory has not done justice to some typical game situations or game models and to the “moves” that are peculiar to nonzero-sum games of strategy. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 284

Categorization

• XREF: This is the methodological bridge to Gambetta and Milgrom: Schelling argues the missing ingredient is exactly the enforcement system, which private-protection theory (Gambetta) and private-judge analysis (Milgrom et al.) supply. — connects to: Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 30; Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202; Quota systems replace tacit coordination games with explicit enforced agreements. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 221 (+5 more)

Related

• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation (similarity 0.85)
• Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly (similarity 0.84)
• Normal-form representation erases the communication and enforcement structures that make tactics work. (similarity 0.82)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.82)
• Quota systems replace tacit coordination games with explicit enforced agreements. (similarity 0.82)
• Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.81)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.80)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.80)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.79)
• Most conflicts are variable-sum games with common interests (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.79)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367
• In this Article, Professor Schauer examines divergent uses of the term ‘formalism’ to elucidate its descriptive content. Conceptions of formalism, he argues, involve the notion that rules… #expands (0.75)