Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself.

Evidence

A good laboratory example of the communication-perception part of game strategy is the experiment reported by M. M. Flood, who presented his players with a 2 × 2 nonzero-sum matrix for 100 consecutive tacit plays. The special property of the matrix is that the players can win only by cooperating on a particular cell on each play, but to distribute the winnings for the 100-play sequence they must cooperate on some pattern of alternation among two or more cells that discriminate differently between the two players. And the only means of negotiating over the distribution to be sought and concerting on a pattern of alternating play that achieves it is through the choices they actually make as the play proceeds. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 791

Categorization

• XREF: This is the empirical backbone of the reader’s Milgrom private-judges framework — coordination on alternating patterns as the proto-contract that the Mafia formalizes. — connects to: Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 859; Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 150; Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187 (+2 more)
• DEFINE: Illustrates the tacit-communication mechanism that Schelling treats as central to coordination.

Related

• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.85)
• Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones (similarity 0.85)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.85)
• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.84)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.83)
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations (similarity 0.83)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.83)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point (similarity 0.82)
• Adding free speech barely changes a tacit bargaining game’s character (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device (similarity 0.79)
• Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs (similarity 0.79)
• Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans (similarity 0.79)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.79)
• Quota systems replace tacit coordination games with explicit enforced agreements. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 859
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #qualifies (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187
• Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 150
• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 189
• Adding free speech barely changes a tacit bargaining game’s character #complicates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 249