Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically

Evidence

A third conclusion, which is particularly applicable whenever the facilities for communication are short of perfect, where there is inherent uncertainty about each other’s value systems or choices of strategies, and especially when an outcome must be reached by a sequence of moves or maneuvers, is that some essential part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical. This is not to say just that it is an empirical question how people do actually perform in mixed-motive games, especially games too complicated for intellectual mastery. It is a stronger statement: that the principles relevant to successful play, the strategic principles, the propositions of a normative theory, cannot be derived by purely analytical means from a priori considerations. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366

Categorization

• SEED: Could extend into how third-party enforcement (like Don Corleone’s) is itself an empirical, contextual practice rather than a deductive model — linking to the reader’s analytical scaffolding.
• XREF: connects to: Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 662; Side payments convert pure games into mixed bargaining games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 737; Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202 (+5 more)

Related

• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.85)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.83)
• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation (similarity 0.83)
• Hall’s method reads conjunctures to find strategic moves, not first principles (similarity 0.83)
• Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.81)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.80)
• Most conflicts are variable-sum games with common interests (similarity 0.80)
• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage (similarity 0.79)
• A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point. (similarity 0.79)
• Normal-form representation erases the communication and enforcement structures that make tactics work. (similarity 0.79)