Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation

Evidence

On the strategy of pure conflict—the zero-sum games—game theory has yielded important insight and. advice. But on the strategy of action where conflict is mixed with mutual dependence—the nonzero-sum games involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations, criminal deterrence, class war, race war, price war, and blackmail; maneuvering in a bureaucracy or in a traffic jam; and the coercion of one’s own children—traditional game theory has not yielded comparable insight or advice. These are the “games” in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation—tacit, if not explicit—even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202

Categorization

• XREF: Defines the analytic turf that Gambetta’s private-protection framework and the Mafia-as-private-judge reading operate in — conflict mixed with mutual dependence is exactly the clientelist reciprocity of Cosa Nostra. — connects to: Partial randomization can turn a conflict-addled game into a profitable equilibrium — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 747; Most conflicts are variable-sum games with common interests — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 20; Pure conflict almost never occurs even in war — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 19 (+9 more)

Related

• Most conflicts are variable-sum games with common interests (similarity 0.86)
• Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs (similarity 0.85)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.83)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.82)
• Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.82)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.82)
• Pure conflict almost never occurs even in war (similarity 0.81)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.80)
• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.80)
• Even conflict between adversaries can be modeled as partnership discipline (similarity 0.80)
• Partial randomization can turn a conflict-addled game into a profitable equilibrium (similarity 0.80)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.80)
• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366
• Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent #expands (0.80)
• Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 284
• Adversaries in indeterminate games mutually construct the norms that govern their conflict #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 379
• Foot-binding and FGC persisted as game-theoretic equilibria, not cultural preference #exemplifies (0.75) — , The Rod and the Child, 7331