Sanctions either alter egoistic utilities or provide assurance to cooperative agents.

Evidence

This is the situation inside a Hobbesian structure. The motivation to cooperation is egoistic, since it lies essentially in the fear of the sanctions of the sovereign. However, the motivation to cooperation is also a macromotivation, because what the sovereign’s sanctions are designed to bring about (among other things) is a motivation, in general, to cooperate. It is not an accident that, from egoistic considerations, the agent on these various occasions cooperated: he knew that what he had egoistic reason to do was, precisely, to cooperate. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Much of our ordinary cooperative activity is embedded in groups of which we are members. Groups are themselves the focus of cooperation for collective purposes, and they can help to induce cooperative behavior by their members even in essentially dyadic relationships. In the former case, when we need collective action, we might wonder whether our groups can be trusted to cooperate in accomplishing our purpose. In the latter case, we often find that our groups oversee our individual actions and induce us to be cooperative even though we could not say that the group and its members trust us. The way small communities induce their members to behave in certain cooperative or coordinative ways is through sanctions for the violation of communal norms, among the most important of which is a norm of cooperativeness within the group. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Hobbesian sanctions produce egoistic macro-motivation to cooperate — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194; Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern; Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808 (+4 more)

Related

• Hobbesian sanctions produce egoistic macro-motivation to cooperate (similarity 0.89)
• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members (similarity 0.88)
• Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern (similarity 0.86)
• Sanctions can provide assurance to cooperative agents, not just deter egoists. (similarity 0.84)
• Enforced sanctions under governments underwrite all ordinary trust (similarity 0.84)
• Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do (similarity 0.83)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. (similarity 0.81)
• Coercion and interests alone compel cooperation even without shared values (similarity 0.81)
• Explaining how cooperative groups formed requires enforcement mechanisms, not just expulsion of the asocial. (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperation rests on coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Hobbesian sanctions produce egoistic macro-motivation to cooperate #corroborates (0.95) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194
• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members #exemplifies (0.90) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808
• Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern #expands (0.88)
• Institutions can mimic encapsulated-interest incentives to substitute for ongoing relationships. #expands (0.85)
• Money and love codes neutralize direct power by separating sanctions #complicates (0.75)