External legal and social sanctions remain circumventable

Evidence

In essence, the game relies on the familiar strategy of tit-for-tat, in which one player (say an established dealer) agrees to comply with the rules of the game until the other side violates them but will punish that player by defecting from the cooperative solution if the other player has done so in the previous round. In general, the established dealer adopts a strategy that promises cooperation to those who cooperate and punishment to those who defect. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: External legal sanctions alone cannot curb harmful behavior — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 30; Sanctions against non-deference are usually signaled rather than executed — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 483; Social sanctions deter only those with reputations worth losing — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 1380 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. #complicates (0.78) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193