Hobbesian sanctions produce egoistic macro-motivation to cooperate

Evidence

This is the situation inside a Hobbesian structure. The motivation to cooperation is egoistic, since it lies essentially in the fear of the sanctions of the sovereign. However, the motivation to cooperation is also a macromotivation, because what the sovereign’s sanctions are designed to bring about (among other things) is a motivation, in general, to cooperate. It is not an accident that, from egoistic considerations, the agent on these various occasions cooperated: he knew that what he had egoistic reason to do was, precisely, to cooperate. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194

Categorization

• XREF: Directly connects to Hobbesian sovereign sanctions being replaced by the doctor’s wife in Saramago; the wife functions as a sovereign whose observability supplies non-accidental cooperation. — connects to: Opening with cooperation is rational self-interest, not mere morality — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 544; Functional explanations work when behavior responds to incentives; Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808 (+13 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194

Broader Connections

• Coercion and interests alone compel cooperation even without shared values #corroborates (0.85)
• Egoistic motivations alone cannot sustain cooperation without plausible self-regulating structures #qualifies (0.82)
• Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern #expands (0.80)
• Cooperation has no single solution; motivations combine and overdetermine action #qualifies (0.75)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #expands (0.72) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781