Explaining how cooperative groups formed requires enforcement mechanisms, not just expulsion of the asocial.

Evidence

Sword. Philosophers commonly neglect the question of how fairness norms are enforced, but the issue is central to an evolutionary account of their origin. Baumard et al. are doubtless right in arguing that cooperatively inclined folk somehow came together in groups, and maintained their cooperative integrity by expelling asocial individuals. However, a story in which nice folk meet in the forest and set up house together is impossibly naive. The literature is full of more plausible stories appealing to assortative mating and kin selection. My own favorite involves a group selection argument that is immune to the standard criticism (Binmore 2005, p. 12). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 281

Categorization

• QUESTION: What is Binmore’s group selection argument that is ‘immune to the standard criticism’? Worth chasing in Binmore 2005.
• XREF: connects to: Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 173; Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808; Small groups succeed at collective action because dyadic trust motivates cooperation (+2 more)

Related

• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align (similarity 0.83)
• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members (similarity 0.83)
• Small groups succeed at collective action because dyadic trust motivates cooperation (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion. (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do (similarity 0.81)
• Sanctions either alter egoistic utilities or provide assurance to cooperative agents. (similarity 0.79)
• Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members #corroborates (0.95) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808
• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #corroborates (0.90)
• Small groups succeed at collective action because dyadic trust motivates cooperation #contradicts (0.85)
• Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do #expands (0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 133