Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle.

Evidence

A conflict-of-interest problem of this type—two cars approaching an asymmetrical narrow place in the road from opposite directions—was included in the questionnaire described in Chapter 3. The results bore out the general principle, but were omitted for brevity from Chapter 3. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 875

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 662; Parties cannot choose which coordination signal will govern them — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 168; Desperate mutual need makes even poor signals coordinate action — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201

Related

• Parties cannot choose which coordination signal will govern them (similarity 0.83)
• Desperate mutual need makes even poor signals coordinate action (similarity 0.78)