Coordination requires a common source of suggestion
Evidence
The bystander who jumps into an intersection and begins to direct traffic at an impromptu traffic jam is conceded the power to discriminate among cars by being able to offer a sufficient increase in efficiency to benefit even the cars most discriminated against; his directions have only the power of suggestion, but coordination requires the common acceptance of some source of suggestion. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 334
Categorization
- XREF: Why stratification is stable: the arbiter who brings any efficiency gain at all is tolerated even when unfair, sustaining the Don’s role. — connects to: Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 655; Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134; Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147 (+6 more)
Related
- Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.81)
- Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.81)
- Tacit coordination is guess-the-guesser recursion, not prediction of average behavior. (similarity 0.81)
- Parties cannot choose which coordination signal will govern them (similarity 0.80)
- Effective political action requires common opinions, affections, and interests (similarity 0.80)
- Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.79)
- Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678 - Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require
#expands(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669 - Group improvisation can be seeded by collective possibility statements
#exemplifies(0.75)