Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure
Evidence
What the players need is some signal to coordinate strategies; if they cannot find it in the mathematical configuration of the payoffs, they can look for it anywhere else. And strategies may occur in such fashion, or with such labels or connotations, as to provide a potential basis for ordering them or sorting them that rational players find useful. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678
Categorization
- XREF: The power of labels and connotations as coordination devices parallels the role of socially recognized symbols (like the Godfather’s reputation) that Gambetta’s protection-market analysis depends on. — connects to: Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 655; Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669; Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 682 (+7 more)
- DEFINE: Clarifies Schelling’s expanded notion of what counts as a ‘clue’ for coordination—anything with salience.
Related
- Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.85)
- Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key (similarity 0.83)
- Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device (similarity 0.82)
- Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.82)
- Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium (similarity 0.82)
- Coordination requires a common source of suggestion (similarity 0.81)
- Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural (similarity 0.80)
- The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.80)
- Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans (similarity 0.80)
- Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.80)
- Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.80)
- Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points (similarity 0.79)
- Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it (similarity 0.79)
- Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.79)
- Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 682 - Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans
#corroborates(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 206 - Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players
#corroborates(0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858