Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key

Evidence

These problems are artificial, but they illustrate the point. People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same. Most situations—perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of game—provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the key, or rather finding a key—any key that is mutually recognized as the key becomes the key—may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each other. Whimsy may send the man and his wife to the “lost and found”; or logic may lead each to reflect and to expect the other to reflect on where they would have agreed to meet if they had had a prior agreement to cover the contingency. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘any key that is mutually recognized becomes the key’ point parallels what the reader’s analysis needs: how informal Mafia enforcement relies on symbols and rituals (Godfather-bonds) that both parties can mutually recognize as binding signals. — connects to: Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 655; Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134; Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678 (+6 more)

Related

• Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points (similarity 0.88)
• Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans (similarity 0.88)
• Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device (similarity 0.83)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.83)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit coordination is guess-the-guesser recursion, not prediction of average behavior. (similarity 0.81)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.81)
• Parties cannot choose which coordination signal will govern them (similarity 0.78)
• Focal points require prominence and uniqueness to coordinate action (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure #exemplifies (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678
• Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 206
• Coordination requires a common source of suggestion #contradicts (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 334
• Tacit coordination is guess-the-guesser recursion, not prediction of average behavior. #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 224
• Mutual recognition is the sole escape from solipsistic self-enclosure #corroborates (0.75) — Frantz Fanon, Constance Farrington, Black skin, white masks, 782