Parties cannot choose which coordination signal will govern them
Evidence
Beggars cannot be choosers about the source of their signal, or about its attractiveness compared with others that they can only wish were as conspicuous. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 168
Categorization
- XREF: Schelling’s resignation about signals parallels how disputants in a mafia world accept whatever informal ritual is most conspicuous rather than the fairest or most authoritative. — connects to: Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147; Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 875
Related
- Desperate mutual need makes even poor signals coordinate action (similarity 0.83)
- Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle. (similarity 0.83)
- Coordination requires a common source of suggestion (similarity 0.80)
- Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.79)
- Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key
#expands(0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147 - Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle.
#corroborates(0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 875