Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it

Evidence

Nor can we trip them up if we ask them how they arrived at their expectations. Any grounds that are consistent would do, since any grounds that each expects the other confidently to adopt are grounds that he cannot rationally eschew. Consistent stories are all they need; and if they say that a sign on the blackboard said A-80, B-20, or that they saw in a bulletin that two other players, named Aʹ and Bʹ, split 80-20, and that they confidently perceived that this was clear indication to both of them of what to expect—that this was the only “expectable” outcome—we cannot catch them in error and prove them irrational. They may be irrational; but the evidence will not show it. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 653

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 257; Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858; Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 682 (+2 more)

Related

• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.89)
• Rational agreement operates through shared psychic expectations, not mathematical reasoning (similarity 0.88)
• Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium (similarity 0.85)
• Mathematical solutions only focus expectations when players perceive each other as mathematicians (similarity 0.85)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.83)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.82)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.81)
• Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural (similarity 0.81)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.79)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.79)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.79)
• Players win only by drawing a division line both can anticipate identically (similarity 0.79)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 257
• Rational agreement operates through shared psychic expectations, not mathematical reasoning #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 275
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858
• Players win only by drawing a division line both can anticipate identically #exemplifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 234
• Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium #complicates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 682