Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural

Evidence

In a game as abstract as the matrix in Fig. 28, there is little to guide them but the numbers; and between the alternative rules of picking the lesser pair or the greater, the latter probably has more plausibility. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 676

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 353; A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 873; Institutions and traditions persist because they are conspicuous coordination solutions. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 222

Related

• A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point. (similarity 0.87)
• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted (similarity 0.83)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.82)
• Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium (similarity 0.81)
• Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it (similarity 0.81)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.80)
• In coordination, neither player can outsmart the other without outsmarting himself (similarity 0.80)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.80)
• Partial randomization can turn a conflict-addled game into a profitable equilibrium (similarity 0.79)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.79)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 353
• A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point. #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 873