Punishing high contributors can erase the cooperative benefits of punishment.

Evidence

In a recent study, Herrmann et al. (2008) ran a PGG with punishment in 16 comparable participant pools around the world. They observed huge cross-societal variations. In some pools, participants punished high contributors as much as they punished low contributors, whereas in other pools, participants punished only low contributors. In some pools, antisocial punishment was strong enough to remove the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. Such behavior completely contradicts the view that the purpose of punishment is to sustain cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 190

Categorization

  • QUESTION: What distinguished the pools that punished high contributors from those that did not? Herrmann et al. found cultural predictors; worth chasing the original study for the societal variables.
  • XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in how visible ritual punishment (fumi-e) can backfire or be redirected — antisocial punishment as a mirror of authorities’ enforced norms. — connects to: Punishment functions as negative redistribution to correct prior unfair gains — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 175; Costly punishment sustains cooperation that otherwise decays over repeated rounds. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 171; Antisocial punishment is driven by low contributors’ sense of unfair treatment. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 192 (+1 more)

Broader Connections