Organized interest-group stances do not substantially track average citizens’ preferences.

Evidence

But net interest-group stands are not substantially correlated with the preferences of average citizens. Taking all interest groups together, the index of net interest-group alignment correlates only a non-significant . with average citizens’ preferences! (Refer to table 2.) This casts grave doubt on David Truman’s and others’ argument that Table 1 Theoretical predictions concerning the independent influence of sets of actors upon policy outcomes Majoritarian Pluralism y n Y Y Y Biased Pluralism n n y y Y Articles | Testing Theories of American Politics organized interest groups tend to do a good job of representing the population as a whole. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 76

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s core task of separating rhetoric from actual policy-logic correlations. — connects to: Correlated elite and mass preferences do not reflect citizen influence on policy. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 135; Interest groups do not amplify majority policy preferences; business groups dominate despite opposing them. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 125; Interest groups shape policy independent of citizen and elite preferences. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 113 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Powerful business interest groups actively oppose average citizens’ policy preferences. #exemplifies (0.90) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 133
• Interest groups shape policy independent of citizen and elite preferences. #corroborates (0.88) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 113
• Correlated elite and mass preferences do not reflect citizen influence on policy. #expands (0.85) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 135
• Interest groups do not amplify majority policy preferences; business groups dominate despite opposing them. #expands (0.82) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 125
• Ordinary citizens hold little independent influence over U.S. policy #corroborates (0.82)
• U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree #expands (0.80)
• General public opinion barely moves policy outcomes when elite preferences are held constant. #corroborates (0.80) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 97