Policy outcomes modestly favor the side with greater interest-group resources.
Evidence
Frank Baumgartner and his colleagues, in their meticulous examination of 98 cases of congressional policy making in which interest groups were active, investigated whether the magnitude of group resources that were deployed was related to outcomes across those cases. In their multivariate analyses, Baumgartner et al. found a modest tendency for policy outcomes to favor the side that enjoyed greater resources (PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, membership size, etc.). — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 45
Categorization
- XREF: Relevant to measuring policy responsiveness as a function of deployed resources — a proxy distinct from Gilens’s income-percentile approach that the reader is hunting for. — connects to: Interest groups shape policy independent of citizen and elite preferences. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 113; U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree; Expellee groups could veto policy options but not shape policy positively — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 178 (+2 more)
Broader Connections
- Policy congruence favors the rich only where policy rarely changes
#qualifies(0.82) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 84 - Expellee groups could veto policy options but not shape policy positively
#exemplifies(0.80) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 178 - Interest groups shape policy independent of citizen and elite preferences.
#complicates(0.78) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 113 - U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree
#expands(0.75)