Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence.

Evidence

The importance of business groups’ numerical advantage is also revealed when we rescale our measures of business and mass-oriented interest-group alignments to reflect the differing number of groups in each of these categories. Using this rescaled measure, a parallel analysis to that in table 4 shows that on a group-for-group basis the average individual business group and the average mass-oriented group appears to be about equally influential. The greater total influence of business groups in our analysis results chiefly from the fact that more of them are generally engaged on each issue (roughly twice as many, on average), not that a single business-oriented group has more clout on average than a single mass-based group. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124

Categorization

• XREF: Refines what ‘interest group power’ means by decomposing it into count vs. intensity—relevant to the reader’s staircase model of who influences policy. — connects to: Interest-group power is measured as a logged count of powerful groups per side. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 60; U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree; Larger groups necessarily meet on a lower, more banal common level — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 3509 (+2 more)
• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source

Related

• Business policy dominance stems from numerical advantage, not superior per-group clout (similarity 0.93)
• Business lobbying dominance stems from group count, not per-group clout (similarity 0.91)
• Business interest groups wield roughly twice the policy influence of mass-based groups. (similarity 0.88)
• Interest groups do not amplify majority policy preferences; business groups dominate despite opposing them. (similarity 0.88)
• Interest-group power is measured as a logged count of powerful groups per side. (similarity 0.86)
• Powerful business interest groups actively oppose average citizens’ policy preferences. (similarity 0.86)
• Business and mass-based interest groups oppose proposed policy changes at similar rates (similarity 0.83)
• Interest groups shape policy independent of citizen and elite preferences. (similarity 0.83)
• Business interest groups oppose policy changes less often than mass-based groups do. (similarity 0.83)
• Economic elites dominate US policy while average citizens exert little influence (similarity 0.80)
• Average citizens have little independent influence on U.S. policy relative to economic elites. (similarity 0.80)
• Organized interest-group stances do not substantially track average citizens’ preferences. (similarity 0.80)
• No prior study jointly assessed interest-group, public, and elite influence on policy. (similarity 0.79)
• Most interest-group lobbying represents business, not the poor or workers. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Larger groups necessarily meet on a lower, more banal common level #expands (0.75) — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 3509