Correlated elite and mass preferences do not reflect citizen influence on policy.

Evidence

But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.) … We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 135

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes first, second, and third faces of power as agenda-setting and preference-shaping versus direct policy influence.
• XREF: connects to: Average citizens have little independent influence on U.S. policy relative to economic elites. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 1; Economic elites dominate US policy while average citizens exert little influence — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 11; Business success rates in Congress do not by themselves demonstrate influence. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 44 (+12 more)

Broader Connections

• Congruence between policy and affluent preferences cannot distinguish blocking from enacting power. #expands (0.92) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 28
• Ordinary citizens hold little independent influence over U.S. policy #expands (0.90)
• U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree #corroborates (0.85)
• Policy congruence favors the rich only where policy rarely changes #qualifies (0.80) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 84