Interest-group alignment is logged difference of weighted pro versus con groups

Evidence

Gilens, using a modified version of this simple count of the number of “powerful” interest groups favoring (minus those opposing) each proposed policy change, developed a measure of Net Interest Group Alignment. To the set of groups on the “Power 25” lists (which seemed to neglect certain major business interests) he added ten key industries that had reported the highest lobbying expenditures. … Net Interest-Group Alignment 5 ln(# Strongly Favor 1 [0.5 * # Somewhat Favor] 1 1) - ln(# Strongly Oppose 1 [0.5 * # Somewhat Oppose] 1 1). — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 62

Categorization

• QUESTION: This is the core empirical instrument the reader seeks — though it measures group alignment, not income-percentile responsiveness. The reader should check whether this logged net-alignment index is what feeds their 10th/50th/90th percentile policy-responsiveness regressions, or whether there’s a further separate operationalization.
• DEFINE: Precise algebraic definition of Net Interest-Group Alignment, including the half-weighting of moderate positions and the +1 constant to keep logs defined, plus the log transform justified by diminishing returns.
• XREF: connects to: A simple powerful-group count proxies well for full resource-weighted interest-group indices — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 59

Broader Connections

• A simple powerful-group count proxies well for full resource-weighted interest-group indices #corroborates (0.78) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 59