Interest-group power is measured as a logged count of powerful groups per side.

Evidence

Gilens, using a modified version of this simple count of the number of “powerful” interest groups favoring (minus those opposing) each proposed policy change, developed a measure of Net Interest Group Alignment. To the set of groups on the “Power 25” lists (which seemed to neglect certain major business interests) he added ten key industries that had reported the highest lobbying expenditures. (For the final list of included industries and interest groups, refer to Appendix 1.) For each of the 1,779 instances of proposed policy change, Gilens and his assistants drew upon multiple sources to code all engaged interest groups as “strongly favorable,” “somewhat favorable,” “somewhat unfavorable,” or “strongly unfavorable” to the change. He then combined the numbers of groups on each side of a given issue, weighting “somewhat” favorable or somewhat unfavorable positions at half the magnitude of “strongly” favorable or strongly unfavorable positions. In order to allow for the likelihood of diminishing returns as the net number of groups on a given side increases (an increase from 10 to 11 groups likely matters less than a jump from 1 to 2 does), he took the logarithms of the number of pro groups and the number of con groups before subtracting. Thus, Net Interest-Group Alignment 5 ln(# Strongly Favor 1 [0.5 * # Somewhat Favor] 1 1) - ln(# Strongly Oppose 1 [0.5 * # Somewhat Oppose] 1 1). — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 60

Categorization

• DEFINE: Spells out the full construction of Net Interest-Group Alignment, including the logged count design to handle diminishing returns.
• XREF: connects to: Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 124

Related

• Interest-group alignment is logged difference of weighted pro versus con groups (similarity 0.89)
• Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. (similarity 0.86)
• Business lobbying dominance stems from group count, not per-group clout (similarity 0.84)
• Business policy dominance stems from numerical advantage, not superior per-group clout (similarity 0.84)
• A simple powerful-group count proxies well for full resource-weighted interest-group indices (similarity 0.83)
• Interest groups do not amplify majority policy preferences; business groups dominate despite opposing them. (similarity 0.82)
• Business interest groups wield roughly twice the policy influence of mass-based groups. (similarity 0.81)
• Powerful business interest groups actively oppose average citizens’ policy preferences. (similarity 0.80)
• Organized interest-group stances do not substantially track average citizens’ preferences. (similarity 0.79)
• Policy outcomes modestly favor the side with greater interest-group resources. (similarity 0.79)
• Interest groups shape policy independent of citizen and elite preferences. (similarity 0.79)