Business interest groups wield roughly twice the policy influence of mass-based groups.
Evidence
Accordingly, we computed separate net-interest-groupalignment indices for business-oriented and for massbased groups (refer to Appendix 1 for lists of each) and included both of them in a new multivariate analysis, along with the preferences of average citizens and economic elites—dropping our previous measure of the net alignment of all interest groups. … The results of this analysis are given in table 4. Clearly the predictions of Biased Pluralism theories fare substantially better than those of Majoritarian Pluralism theories. The influence coefficients for both mass-based and business-oriented interest groups are positive and highly significant statistically, but the coefficient for business groups is nearly twice as large as that for the mass groups. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 121
Categorization
- SEED: The interest-group influence coefficient ratio (business nearly 2x mass-based) is a concrete quantitative hook for an essay on how ‘pluralism’ in practice is an uneven tilt.
- XREF: connects to: Affluent Americans shape policy adoption far more than interest-group support does. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 98; Business lobbying dominance stems from group count, not per-group clout — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 124; Business policy dominance stems from numerical advantage, not superior per-group clout — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 124
Broader Connections
- Business policy dominance stems from numerical advantage, not superior per-group clout
#contradicts(0.90) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124 - Business lobbying dominance stems from group count, not per-group clout
#contradicts(0.85) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124