Business lobbying dominance stems from group count, not per-group clout

Evidence

The advantage of business-oriented groups in shaping policy outcomes reflects their numerical advantage within the interest-group universe in Washington, and also the infrequency with which business groups are found simultaneously on both sides of a proposed policy change. Both these factors (numerical dominance and relative cohesion) play a part in the much stronger correlation of the overall interest-group alignment index with business groups than with mass-oriented groups (. versus .47, table 2). The importance of business groups’ numerical advantage is also revealed when we rescale our measures of business and mass-oriented interest-group alignments to reflect the differing number of groups in each of these categories. Using this rescaled measure, a parallel analysis to that in table 4 shows that on a group-for-group basis the average individual business group and the average mass-oriented group appears to be about equally influential. The greater total influence of business groups in our analysis results chiefly from the fact that more of them are generally engaged on each issue (roughly twice as many, on average), not that a single business-oriented group has more clout on average than a single mass-based group. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124

Categorization

• ADDENDUM: The ‘mass vs. count’ mechanism parallels how stratification in the sacrifice essay operates through institutional weight rather than per-capita power — business groups win by volume of engagement, an infrastructure argument.
• QUESTION: Worth chasing whether per-group parity holds once dollars spent and access measures are controlled, not just positional alignment counts.
• XREF: connects to: Most interest-group lobbying represents business, not the poor or workers. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 40; Business interest groups wield roughly twice the policy influence of mass-based groups. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 121; Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 124 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. #expands (0.98) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124
• Business policy dominance stems from numerical advantage, not superior per-group clout #expands (0.98) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124
• Majority group cohesion, not weakness, is the precondition for minority influence #qualifies (0.72) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1415