Economic elites dominate US policy while average citizens exert little influence

Evidence

The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence. Our results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 11

Categorization

• ADDENDUM: This is the empirical core of measuring a ‘control deficit’ independent of discourse — exactly the instrument being hunted in the reading purpose.
• XREF: Connects to theories of economic-elite domination vs. pluralism, echoing work by Gilens and political science debates on US democracy. — connects to: Average citizens have little independent influence on U.S. policy relative to economic elites. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 1; Ordinary citizens hold little independent influence over U.S. policy; Economic elites exert the largest independent influence on U.S. policy. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 91 (+11 more)

Broader Connections

• Economic elites exert the largest independent influence on U.S. policy. #corroborates (0.97) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 91
• Average citizens have almost no independent influence over U.S. policy. #corroborates (0.97) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 90
• Ordinary citizens hold little independent influence over U.S. policy #corroborates (0.95)
• U.S. policy responds to elites and interest groups, not the public. #corroborates (0.93) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 93
• General public opinion barely moves policy outcomes when elite preferences are held constant. #corroborates (0.92) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 97
• Correlated elite and mass preferences do not reflect citizen influence on policy. #expands (0.88) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 135
• U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree #corroborates (0.85)
• Economic dominance does not automatically translate into political rule #complicates (0.82)
• Policy congruence favors the rich only where policy rarely changes #qualifies (0.80) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 84
• Elite superiority in policymaking should be tested empirically, not assumed #qualifies (0.78) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 141
• Small networked elite groups can dominate policy debates without being a majority #expands (0.75) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 443
• Frame cultural-policy choices as technical rather than political serves dominant elites #expands (0.74)