Business and mass-based interest groups oppose proposed policy changes at similar rates
Evidence
Perhaps counterintuitively, it turns out that business groups tilted somewhat less toward opposing proposed changes (33 percent opposed, 26 percent in favor) than mass-based groups did (38 percent opposed, 20 percent in favor.) β Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 152
Categorization
- XREF: Contradicts the intuition that big-business lobby bias is about reflexive opposition to change; dovetails with the earlier finding that business clout comes from group numbers, not per-group influence. β connects to: Interest groups more often oppose than favor proposed policy changes. β Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:β¦, 116; Interest groups do not amplify majority policy preferences; business groups dominate despite opposing them. β Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:β¦, 125; Powerful business interest groups actively oppose average citizensβ policy preferences. β Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:β¦, 133