A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work

Evidence

A better definition, perhaps, would make the promise a commitment that is controlled by the second party, that is, a commitment that the second party can enforce or release as he chooses. But timing is important here. The promise just discussed will work after the threat is fully committed; but if the victim of the promise (Column) can renounce the promise in advance, so that Row knows that Column expects zero if he chooses II, the threat itself is deterred. And, if the threat and promise are contrived in such a way as to be “legally” inseparable or if they are accomplished by some irreversible maneuver, the definition becomes obscured. (In fact, the definition breaks down whenever the equivalent of a promise is obtained by some irrevocable act rather than by a “legal” commitment.) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 309

Categorization

• XREF: Corleone’s fatal vulnerability — his promises rest on reputational/irrevocable acts rather than legal commitments — is precisely where Schelling’s definition breaks down. — connects to: Public pledges of reputation can make concessions impossible — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 81; Promises are needed whenever an agreement leaves incentive to cheat — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 114; An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345 (+3 more)

Related

• Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure (similarity 0.83)
• Promises are needed whenever an agreement leaves incentive to cheat (similarity 0.83)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.80)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.79)
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply (similarity 0.79)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.79)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.78)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345
• The right to be sued gives one power to make credible promises #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 113
• Contract law enforces promises only when stakes are high and reliance is costly #qualifies (0.80)
• Promises fall into three kinds with different legal enforceability #qualifies (0.75)