A conditional commitment fails if its conditions cannot be verified after the fact

Evidence

During 1950, the Economic Cooperation Administration declared its intention to reward Marshall Plan countries that followed especially sound policies, and to penalize those that did not, through the device of larger or smaller aid allotments. But since the base figures had not been determined, and since their determination would ultimately involve judgment rather than formulas, there would be no way afterwards to see whether in fact the additions and subtractions were made, and the plan suffered from implausibility. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 717

Categorization

• XREF: Shows why the Don’s system holds while formal rules fail: his punishments are observably carried out, whereas the ECA plan was unverifiable. — connects to: Observable disputes in trade cannot be resolved without verification of the underlying claims — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 68; A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 126

Broader Connections

• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 126