Rational agreement operates through shared psychic expectations, not mathematical reasoning

Evidence

We are dealing here with the players’ shared appreciations, preoccupations, obsessions, and sensitivities to suggestion, not with the resources that they can draw on when necessary. If the phenomenon of “rational agreement” is fundamentally psychic—convergence of expectations—there is no presumption that mathematical game theory is essential to the process of reaching agreement, hence no basis for presuming that mathematics is a main source of inspiration in the convergence process. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 275

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: Schelling’s radical claim that even ‘rational’ agreement is fundamentally psychic rather than mathematical is a paradigm-challenging insight about the microfoundations of coordination.
• XREF: connects to: Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 653; Being rational, informed, and in control is not always strategic — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 52; Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201 (+8 more)

Related

• Mathematical solutions only focus expectations when players perceive each other as mathematicians (similarity 0.88)
• Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it (similarity 0.88)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.85)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.84)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.83)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.81)
• Interaction between two minds cannot be modeled by formal deduction alone (similarity 0.81)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.80)
• Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations (similarity 0.80)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Interaction between two minds cannot be modeled by formal deduction alone #corroborates (0.92) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 368
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit #corroborates (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 177
• Communication succeeds only through shared contextual beliefs that cannot be fully formalized #expands (0.88)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #corroborates (0.88) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858
• Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification #exemplifies (0.85)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187
• Mathematical proof compels assent through guided decision rather than world-fact or command. #responds-to (0.82) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 341