Players may manufacture ex-post reasons to justify coordinating on a salient equilibrium

Evidence

One argument might be that, in the absence of any way of knowing whether to aim for (i, I) or (ii, II), one should consider what insurance he can fall back on. The row chooser gets nothing if he wrongly chooses the upper row, he gets 5 if he wrongly chooses the lower row, “wrong” meaning that he fails to rendezvous with his partner for 10. He might then choose the lower row arguing that he does so because he will at least get 5 if he does not get 10, and his chances of getting 10 are no worse with this choice. Perhaps this is all that “rationality” requires of him; but it might be more perceptive to reason as follows. “Comparing just (i, I) and (ii, II) my partner and I have no way of concerting our choices. There must be some way, however, so let’s look for it. The only other place to look is in the cells (ii, I) and (i, II). Do they give us the hint we need to concert on 10 apiece? Yes, they do; they seem to “point toward” (ii, II). They provide either a reason or an excuse for believing or pretending that (ii, II) is better than (i, I); since we need an excuse, if not a reason, for pretending, if not believing, that one of the equilibrium pairs is better, or more distinguished, or more prominent, or more eligible, than the other, and since I find no competing rule or instruction to follow or clue to pursue, we may as well agree to use this rule to reach a meeting of minds.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 682

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘excuse for pretending’ rationality here mirrors how institutions manufacture post-hoc justifications for conventions; relevant to the reader’s Milgrom private-judge analysis. — connects to: Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 653; Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678; Suggestive background stories can shift which equilibria players settle on — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 380

Related

• Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it (similarity 0.85)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.82)
• Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural (similarity 0.81)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.79)
• Suggestive background stories can shift which equilibria players settle on (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Suggestive background stories can shift which equilibria players settle on #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 380