Even splits occur in bargaining even without any outside options.

Evidence

Baumard et al. further argue that outside options are necessary for even splits: “Quite generally, in the absence of outside options, there is no particular reason why an interaction should be governed by fairness considerations” (sect. 2.1.4, para. 2). Contradicting this claim, Nash showed for a two-player game (no outside option) that “the solution has each bargainer getting the same money profit” (Nash 1950, p. 162). Schelling (1960) showed how conspicuous division points, including (but not limited to) equality, can be stable solutions. Also, offers of half (and even more) can be promoted by additional bargaining stages (Goeree & Holt 2000) and reputation (Nowak et al. 2000). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 364

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reading purpose: if fairness need not depend on outside options, then the fumi-e’s power may not hinge solely on destroying the priests’ alternatives — a useful counterpoint to the Big God mechanism framing.

Related

• Fairness evolved as a psychological device because outside market options constrain benefit distribution. (similarity 0.79)
• Fairness in cooperation requires outside options, not contribution. (similarity 0.79)
• Fairness distributions reflect bargaining power, not just effort. (similarity 0.78)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.78)