In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength.
Evidence
Incidentally, dropping AB vertically in Fig. 2 to below the level αβ would illustrate an important principle, namely, that moving one point in a manner “unfavorable” to North may actually improve the outcome for him. The threat that kept him from winning in Fig. 2 depends on the comparative attractiveness of AB over αB for North; if AB is made worse for him than αβ he becomes immune to the threat, which then is not made, and he wins at αB. This is an abstract example of the principle that, in bargaining, weakness may be strength. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the reader’s broader theme — the Mafia thrives where the state is weak because weakness makes resistance costly, and to hostage mechanics where appearing vulnerable can forestall threats. — connects to: Binding oneself can paradoxically strengthen one’s bargaining position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 60; Superior resources and skill can actually disadvantage a bargainer — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 61; Being unreachable during negotiation strengthens one’s bargaining position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 71 (+8 more)
Related
- Weak local forces can succeed when international conditions favor them (similarity 0.84)
- Being unreachable during negotiation strengthens one’s bargaining position (similarity 0.84)
- Superior resources and skill can actually disadvantage a bargainer (similarity 0.83)
- Binding oneself can paradoxically strengthen one’s bargaining position (similarity 0.81)
Broader Connections
- Treaty most-favored clauses can strengthen a weaker ally’s bargaining position.
#exemplifies(0.92) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 360