Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance

Evidence

What makes the threat or ordinary commitment a difficult tactic to employ and an interesting one to study is the problem of finding a means to commitment, the available “penalty” to invoke against one’s own nonperformance. There is consequently a related set of tactics that consists of maneuvering one’s self into a position in which one no longer has any effective choice over how he shall behave or respond. The purpose of these tactics is to get rid of an embarrassing initiative, making the outcome depend solely on the other party’s choice. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 317

Categorization

• XREF: Directly the Schellingian ‘credible commitment’ the reader is mapping onto Godfather-bonds; defines the mechanism precisely. — connects to: Ritual serves as evidence-free commitment for contracts illegality prevents ratifying; Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714; Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 40 (+10 more)
• DEFINE: Defines commitment as the act of finding a penalty to invoke against one’s own nonperformance.

Related

• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.87)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.86)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.85)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.85)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.83)
• Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action (similarity 0.83)
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge (similarity 0.82)
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing (similarity 0.82)
• A non-costly action can still credibly signal sincere belief. (similarity 0.82)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.82)
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply (similarity 0.82)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.82)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.81)
• Failed threats create joint incentives to undo commitments that parties cannot jointly undo (similarity 0.81)
• Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Credible commitment requires proof beyond mere assertion of intent. #expands (0.80)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23
• A threat to act is only credible if one is committed, not merely willing #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 414
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions #complicates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 106