Public pledges of reputation can make concessions impossible

Evidence

A potent means of commitment, and sometimes the only means, is the pledge of one’s reputation. If national representatives can arrange to be charged with appeasement for every small concession, they place concession visibly beyond their own reach. If a union with other plants to deal with can arrange to make any retreat dramatically visible, it places its bargaining reputation in jeopardy and thereby becomes visibly incapable of serious compromise. (The same convenient jeopardy is the basis for the universally exploited defense, “If I did it for you I’d have to do it for everyone else.”) But to commit in this fashion publicity is required. Both the initial offer and the final outcome would have to be known; and if secrecy surrounds either point, or if the outcome is inherently not observable, the device is unavailable. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 81

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘if I did it for you I’d have to do it for everyone else’ defense is exactly how the Don maintains a reputation-based pricing structure — the publicity requirement explains why the Mafia makes spectacles of enforcement. — connects to: Without legal enforcement or reputation audiences, some bargains become impossible — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 115; A threat backed by reputation cannot be unilaterally renounced by its target — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 720; Parties able to make binding commitments outbargain those who cannot — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 72 (+6 more)

Related

• Slogans once embedded in organization cannot be dropped without collapse. (similarity 0.84)
• Without legal enforcement or reputation audiences, some bargains become impossible (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Without legal enforcement or reputation audiences, some bargains become impossible #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 115
• Public commitment makes future fulfillment costly to renege on by invoking present social constraints #expands (0.85)
• Boss elections function as public commitment devices building reputation #exemplifies (0.80)
• Parties able to make binding commitments outbargain those who cannot #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 72
• Concessions require an obvious stopping point to avoid signaling collapse #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 179
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 317
• A threat backed by reputation cannot be unilaterally renounced by its target #complicates (0.70) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 720
• A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work #qualifies (0.70) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 309