Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping

Evidence

“Commitment” is to be interpreted broadly here. It includes maneuvers that leave one in such a position that the option of non-fulfilment no longer exists (as when one intimidates the other car by driving too fast to stop in time), maneuvers that shift the final decision beyond recall to another party whose incentive structure would provide an ex post motive for fulfilment (as when the authority to punish is deliberately given to sadists, or when one shifts his claims and liabilities to an insurance company), and maneuvers that simply “worsen” one’s own payoff in the contingency of non-fulfilment so that even the horror of a mutually damaging fulfilment becomes more attractive (as when one arranges for himself to appear a public coward if he fails to fulfil, or when he puts a plate-glass window in front of his wares or stations women and children on the particular bit of territory that he has threatened somewhat implausibly to defend at great cost). — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 300

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘shifting the final decision beyond recall to another party’ maneuver is exactly the Sicilian Mafia’s hierarchical enforcement — the boss delegates punishment to enforcers whose incentives guarantee retribution, which is the heart of the reader’s Gambetta mapping. — connects to: Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714; An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345; Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 317 (+4 more)
• DEFINE: A taxonomy of credible commitment mechanisms: irreversible positioning, delegated enforcement, and self-worsened payoffs in the contingency of non-compliance.

Related

• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.85)
• Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action (similarity 0.83)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.82)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.82)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.82)
• Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure (similarity 0.81)
• Promises are needed whenever an agreement leaves incentive to cheat (similarity 0.80)
• A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work (similarity 0.80)
• Agreements stay enforceable through the shadow of future bargains (similarity 0.79)
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply (similarity 0.79)
• Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply #exemplifies (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance #exemplifies (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 317
• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 347
• Credit clientelism removes the exit option that bargaining requires #exemplifies (0.85)
• Failed threats create joint incentives to undo commitments that parties cannot jointly undo #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 103