Hinted threats gain credibility precisely because they are deniable

Evidence

What might be called the “legal status” of communication is nicely developed by Goffman: “Tact in regard to face-work often relies for its operation on a tacit agreement to do business through the language of hint—the language of innuendo, ambiguities, well placed pauses, carefully worded jokes, and so on. The rule regarding this unofficial kind of communication is that the sender ought not to act as if he had officially conveyed the message he has hinted at, while the recipients have the right and the obligation to act as if they have not officially received the message contained in the hint. Hinted communication, then, is deniable communication.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 781

Categorization

• XREF: Deniability as the signal’s legal status parallels the mafia’s tacit-cooperation communication the reader tracks. — connects to: A threat backed by reputation cannot be unilaterally renounced by its target — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 720; A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 83; Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain #qualifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 83
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34
• Delegating decisions to agents makes threats more credible #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 330