Alternating indirect reciprocity with public goods sustains cooperation that would otherwise collapse.

Evidence

But in groups that started with one round of indirect reciprocity, followed by one round of public goods, and so on until round 16, the initial high cooperation level of the public goods game did not decline during the eight rounds of the public goods game (comparison between the ®rst and the eighth round of public goods game; paired t-test, n = 10 groups, t = 0.897, P = 0.40), and was on average considerably higher than the cooperation level of the nine groups that had started with eight rounds of public goods (unpaired t-test, d.f. = 17, t = 4.83, P , 0.0002; Fig. 1). When public goods and indirect reciprocity rounds were alternated, the public goods game elicited signi®cantly more cooperation than the indirect reciprocity game — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 16

Categorization

• XREF: This maps neatly onto the reader’s analytical lens: reputation as capital and Zucker’s background trust — the indirect reciprocity rounds function as a social-surveillance mechanism enforcing cooperation in the public goods game, the economic core. — connects to: Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 8; Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 57

Related

• Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. (similarity 0.88)
• Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. (similarity 0.87)
• Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. (similarity 0.85)
• Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners. (similarity 0.80)
• Reputation and anticipated repeat interactions drive stranger cooperation from the first round. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners. #expands (0.78) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 57