Withholding help naturally damages reputation without any formal punishment rule.
Evidence
Obviously, refusing to give in the public goods game reduced the reputation of a player to a similar extent as if this person had refused to give in the indirect reciprocity game: his potential donor in the next round of indirect reciprocity just followed the rules for indirect reciprocity and refused to give to someone with a low image score. This is different from punishing because it does not need any special punishing rule or motivation, and the potential donor actually saves money by refusing to give. — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 28
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the reader’s framework of reputation as essential capital (Milinski) and Zucker’s background trust — this is the experimental mechanism for social exile via reputation. — connects to: Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 31
Related
- Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. (similarity 0.83)
- Group members punish free riders by withholding pairwise help from them. (similarity 0.82)
- Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. (similarity 0.81)
- Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible.
#expands(0.85) — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 31