A continuing relationship functions as a forfeitable bond against cheating.

Evidence

How can people promote the trust necessary for efficient exchange when individuals have short run temptations to cheat? The same question arises whether the traders are legislators swapping votes, medieval merchants exchanging goods, or modern businesspeople trading promises about future deliveries. In each of these situations, one of the important ways in which individuals ensure one another’s honest behavior is by establishing a continuing relationship. In the language of economics, if the relationship itself is a valuable asset that a party could lose by dishonest behavior, then the relationship serves as a bond: a trader would be unwilling to surrender this bond unless the gain from dishonest behavior was large. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 2

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines the economic concept of the relationship-as-bond that underpins the Godfather reading of favor/debt dynamics.
  • XREF: This is the Schellingian credible-commitment framing the reader explicitly seeks; Don Corleone’s favors create bonds his clients cannot surrender. — connects to: Faithfulness is the inertia that sustains relations after their occasion passes; A continuing relationship functions as a bond deterring dishonest trading; Trustworthiness persists only while future gains from the relationship outweigh defection (+10 more)

Broader Connections