Tacit coordination on an outcome requires a distinguishing selection device

Evidence

If two players jointly expect a priori the same outcome, and confidently recognize it as their common expectation, they must have the intellectual power to pick a particular point in common. If the whole $100 can be divided to the nearest penny, there are 9,999 relevant divisions to consider, one of which would have to be picked simultaneously but separately by both players as their expectations of the outcome. But how can two people concert their selections of one item out of 9,999, in the sense that their expectations focus or converge on it, except with odds of 9,999 to 1 against them? The answer must be that they utilize some trick, or clue, or coordinating device that presents itself to them. They must, consciously or unconsciously, use a selection procedure that leads to unique results. There must be something about the point they pick that distinguishes it—if not in their conscious reasoning, at least in our conscious analysis—from the continuum of all possible alternatives. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 655

Categorization

• XREF: Directly grounds the reader’s Gambetta-style focal-point analysis: private protection enforcers face the same tacit-coordination problem over which conventions to adopt. — connects to: Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134; Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678; Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147 (+2 more)
• DEFINE: Codifies the focal-point / selection-device concept in concrete $100-split form.

Related

• Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points (similarity 0.86)
• Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key (similarity 0.83)
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.80)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit coordination is guess-the-guesser recursion, not prediction of average behavior. (similarity 0.79)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.79)
• Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans (similarity 0.79)
• Coordination requires a common source of suggestion (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Coordination requires a common source of suggestion #corroborates (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 334
• Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134
• Players can derive coordination signals from labels and connotations beyond payoff structure #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 678
• Any mutually recognized cue can become the coordination key #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147
• Observing that others accept code-specific reasons requires visible selection processes #expands (0.75)