Peer exclusion deters cheating where binding legal institutions are absent.
Evidence
Many historical and social science studies have demonstrated that, in humans, partner choice can enforce cooperation without coercion or punishment (McAdams 1997). European medieval traders (Greif 1993), Jewish New York jewelers (Bernstein 1992), and Chinese middlemen in South Asia (Landa 1981) have been shown, for instance, to exchange highly valuable goods and services without any binding institutions. What deters people from cheating is the risk of not being chosen as partners in future transactions. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 32
Categorization
- XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s analytical integration of the fumi-e ritual — the Japanese authorities forcing trampling destroys partner choice precisely because visible apostasy removes the ‘risk of not being chosen’ deterrent within the Japanese community. — connects to: Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 29
Related
- Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish (similarity 0.84)
- Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. (similarity 0.82)
- Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.79)
- Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.79)
- Pre-commitment mirrors partner-choice by eliminating tempting options in advance (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish
#expands(0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 29