Costly alliances should dissolve when the threat justifying their costs disappears.

Evidence

A final consideration leads both neorealist perspectives to predict alliance collapse absent threats, and in a shorter, rather than longer, time period. Because alliances entail major costs, neorealist theory tells us that they will form only when members believe benefits outweigh costs. The loss of policy freedom, the political and economic opportunity costs, and the material costs of an alliance commitment will all be weighed against its benefits (security and nonsecurity). Any decrease in benefits relative to costs should be accompanied by resistance to paying those costs. How would this logic apply to NATO? As alliances go, NATO is about as costly in policy and resource terms as one could imagine, short of political union. The Article 5 commitment to aid other partners is clear, direct, and unequivocal. The degree of policy coordination and the resultant narrowing of political maneuvering room have been significant. Lost economic opportunity costs from defense policy coordination and coordinated export controls have been high, as have the direct costs of contributing to the overall military structure—especially for European members who have endured more than four decades of troop exercises, low-flying aircraft, and foreign troops in their lands. A neorealist calculation would expect members to begin to move away from NATO as the threat that had previously justified those costs shrinks. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 41

Categorization

• XREF: This is the core neorealist prediction the reader’s whole inquiry tests — will NATO defy it. Connects to institutionalist persistence arguments (e.g., Keohane’s after-hegemony work) and the puzzle driving this book. — connects to: Alliance theory predicts collapse once threats vanish. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 14; Alliances may persist through habit and precaution after threats recede — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 61; Domestic political costs constrain alliance participation once the founding threat recedes — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 143 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• An alliance persists when its founding enemy vanishes. #corroborates (0.95) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 57
• Alliances can persist and expand purposes after their founding enemy disappears #contradicts (0.90) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 60
• Alliance cohesion theories predict NATO should have dissolved after the Soviet threat vanished #exemplifies (0.90) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 40
• Neorealist theories predict alliances collapse once their external threat fades. #expands (0.88) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 37
• Alliances may persist through habit and precaution after threats recede #qualifies (0.85) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 61
• Domestic political costs constrain alliance participation once the founding threat recedes #qualifies (0.78) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 143
• Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. #expands (0.72) — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 19
• Costly punishment sustains cooperation that otherwise decays over repeated rounds. #complicates (0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 171