Neorealism cannot explain alliance persistence once threats vanish.

Evidence

A final issue arises because neorealist approaches say little about how decision makers will view residual threats or uncertainties following the breakup of a larger threat. Neither the power-based nor the threat-based approach to alliance formation and cohesion tells us this. Is the power of many small states additive? Do many small threats require the same response as one larger one? We would need a theory of threat perception (which neorealism does not provide) to answer the question of when powerful states are also seen as threats. Power-based approaches cannot tell us, for example, why Canada does not fear the United States. Threat-based approaches tell us that states perceived as having “aggressive intentions” will be seen as a threat and responded to; they do not tell us, however, what causes some to see certain states as being aggressive while others do not. We would also need a better theory about security choices that states make about alliance formation and power buildups. Reductions in security preparations also comprise uncharted territory. It is certainly reasonable that states might continue previously successful practices, but theory cannot tell us which ones. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher puts it, “You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the last 12 months!” — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 61

Categorization

• XREF: The home-insurance analogy for alliance persistence is a strong, citable metaphor — connects to the reader’s interest in institutional persistence after an enemy disappears, the core framing for this NATO note-taking. — connects to: All realists hold that external threats are necessary for alliances to form and persist — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 33; Neorealist theories predict alliances collapse once their external threat fades. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 37; Realism explains alliance behavior under threat but fails without one. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 157 (+4 more)
• QUESTION: Thatcher’s insurance quip is vivid but under-theorized — when DO states actually cancel insurance? Analogy admits intuitions theory can’t formalize.
• CANDY: Thatcher’s ‘home insurance’ line is a quotable, instantly graspable metaphor worth sharing.

Broader Connections

• Neorealist theories predict alliances collapse once their external threat fades. #corroborates (0.95) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 37
• Realism explains alliance behavior under threat but fails without one. #corroborates (0.90) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 157
• Alliances with developed organizations survive threats long after they vanish #exemplifies (0.90) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 153
• Alliance theory predicts collapse once threats vanish. #expands (0.85) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 14
• Explaining alliance persistence requires nonrealist unit-level theory. #expands (0.85) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 16
• Deeply institutionalized alliances outlast ad hoc ones against realist expectations #exemplifies (0.85) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 161