Costly punishment sustains cooperation that otherwise decays over repeated rounds.

Evidence

In a typical PGG, several players are given, say, 20 dollars each. The players may contribute part or all of their money to a common pool. The experimenter then triples the common pool and divides it equally among the players, irrespective of the amount of their individual contribution. A self-interested player should contribute nothing to the common pool while hoping to benefit from the contribution of others. Only a fraction of players, however, follow this selfish strategy. When the PGG is played for several rounds (the players being informed in advance of the number of rounds to be played), players typically begin by contributing on average about half of their endowment to the common pool. The level of contributions, however, decreases with each round, until, in the final rounds, most players are behaving in a self-interested manner (Ledyard 1994/1995). … Further experiments have shown that, given the opportunity, participants are disposed to punish others (i.e., to fine them) at a cost to themselves (Yamagishi 1986). When such costly punishment is permitted, cooperation does not deteriorate. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 171

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s framing of fumi-e as destroying partner choice and Big God mechanisms — costly punishment here is the solidarity-preserving counterforce the Japanese authorities disrupt. — connects to: Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 28; Punishing high contributors can erase the cooperative benefits of punishment. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 190; Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193 (+7 more)
• ADDENDUM: Directly parallels the ‘On Sacrifice’ essay’s interest in costly ritual acts that bind groups; here the costly punitive act substitutes for sacrificial giving as a solidarity mechanism.

Related

• Punishing high contributors can erase the cooperative benefits of punishment. (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion. (similarity 0.81)
• Some punishment in public goods games is retributive justice-seeking, not cooperation enforcement. (similarity 0.79)
• People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. #corroborates (0.90) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193
• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members #corroborates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808
• Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion. #contradicts (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 173
• Cooperation survives even when cheating pays hugely and system costs are steep. #expands (0.80)
• Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. #exemplifies (0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 117
• Cooperation can survive even when cheating pays seven times more per round. #expands (0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 122
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. #complicates (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 531
• Weapon escalation ends when costs outweigh benefits and cheaters invade #complicates (0.75) — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 457