Domestic political costs constrain alliance participation once the founding threat recedes

Evidence

Domestic factors, however, also create limits on alliance participation. While alliances have costs which, when paid, benefit certain groups, one must consider that those who pay the costs might also like to see costs shifted in other directions. Certainly when the threat to which an alliance is responding goes away or is substantially reduced, the power of alternative arguments increases. In the context of NATO, it is not difficult to predict that aggregate support would diminish with the end of the cold war. NATO has endured threats in the form of wavering public support but always within the cold war context where the Soviet threat could be used to regenerate support. Public willingness to support an expensive commitment against no obvious enemy will likely decrease as time goes on, especially in countries like Canada and the United States where NATO is viewed as a “foreign” commitment. A Soviet attack on Western Europe during the cold war, with its attendant risks of nuclear war, was plausible to posit as something that NATO citizens should be willing to spend money to prevent; Serbian genocide, no matter how awful, has been a more difficult problem. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 143

Categorization

• XREF: Relevant to the reader’s purpose: the domestic-support argument predicts NATO should erode post-Soviet, which the book’s broader thesis (persistence) must answer; and directly parallels the post-Cold War NATO literature (Wallander, Risse-Kappen). — connects to: Costly alliances should dissolve when the threat justifying their costs disappears. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 41; An alliance persists when its founding enemy vanishes. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 57; Alliances can persist and expand purposes after their founding enemy disappears — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 60 (+10 more)
• DEFINE: Illuminates how cost-shifting disputes and waning public willingness define the boundaries within which leaders must keep an alliance viable without a threat.

Broader Connections

• Alliance cohesion rises and falls with the external threat it balances #expands (0.88) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 36
• Perceived punitive costs from cooperating with successors blocked coalition formation #exemplifies (0.85) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 1240
• Alliance theory predicts collapse once threats vanish. #responds-to (0.82) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 14
• Alliances may persist through habit and precaution after threats recede #qualifies (0.80) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 61
• Both realism and institutionalism ignore the domestic prerequisites of alliance costs #expands (0.78) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 139
• Politicization costs group members in opportunity and personal safety #expands (0.75) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4459
• Extremist dominance in communal wars proves reversible when costs mount #exemplifies (0.72)
• Cross-civilizational alliances persist from inertia and balance-of-power need #complicates (0.72)